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Consumption of globally traded agricultural commodities like soy and palm oil is one of the primary 20 
causes of deforestation and biodiversity loss in some of the world’s most species-rich ecosystems. 21 
However, the complexity of global supply chains has confounded efforts to reduce impacts. Companies 22 
and governments with sustainability commitments struggle to understand their own sourcing patterns, 23 
while the activities of more unscrupulous actors are conveniently masked by the opacity of global 24 
trade. We combine state-of-the art material flow, economic trade and biodiversity impact models to 25 
produce an innovative approach for understanding the impacts of trade on biodiversity loss and the 26 
roles of remote markets and actors. We do this for the production of soy in the Brazilian Cerrado, home 27 
to more than 5% of the world´s species. Distinct sourcing patterns of consumer countries and trading 28 
companies result in substantially different impacts on endemic species. Connections between individual 29 
buyers and specific hotspots explain the disproportionate impacts of some actors on endemic species 30 
and individual threatened species, such as the particular impact of EU consumers on the recent habitat 31 
losses for the iconic Giant Anteater (Myrmecophaga tridactyla). In making these linkages explicit, our 32 
approach enables commodity buyers and investors to target their efforts much more closely to improve 33 
the sustainability of their supply chains in their sourcing regions, while also transforming our ability to 34 
monitor the impact of such commitments over time.    35 
 36 
Significance statement 37 
Agricultural commodity production causes significant biodiversity losses, yet our globalised supply 38 
chains mean that these losses are incurred far from the places of eventual consumption. Public and 39 
private sector actors are making an increasing number of commitments to reduce their environmental 40 
impacts; to date, however, we have had limited understanding of a) impacts at high spatial and 41 
taxonomic resolution, and b) particular consumption drivers and supply chain actors mediating trade 42 
and consumption. Without these, it is difficult to devise solutions. We link three state-of-the-art 43 
models to provide practical insights on the impacts of soy grown in the Brazilian Cerrado, an 44 
exceptionally biodiverse savannah that hosts some 5% of the world’s species.  45 
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MAIN TEXT 46 
\body 47 
Species are being lost at 1-2 orders of magnitude above background rates (1), with greatest losses 48 
resulting from habitat conversion and degradation – particularly appropriation for agriculture (2–4). 49 
Much of the impact of food crop production in biodiverse tropical regions is associated with 50 
commodities destined for export (5) and as much as 80-99% of the biodiversity impact of food crop 51 
consumption in industrialised countries is incurred abroad (5). Work linking biodiversity threats to 52 
global financial flows at country level indicates that at least 30% of threats to globally-threatened 53 
species are linked to international trade (6–8). Growing recognition of the role of global consumption 54 
in driving remote environmental damage elsewhere (9–11) has led to a number of private- and public-55 
sector commitments to reduce these impacts, particularly in agricultural commodity supply chains 56 
(12). However, our ability to monitor in practically useful detail whether governments or businesses 57 
are making progress towards these commitments has been limited. 58 
To devise and monitor solutions for sustainable production and consumption we need to know the 59 
location of production areas to a high degree of spatial accuracy, and understand the biodiversity 60 
impacts of production in these places. Crucially, we must also understand how impacts are connected 61 
to globalised supply chains and the key actors involved (13). Progress on sustainability in supply chains 62 
will need clear and measurable targets, pathways to achieve them, and accountability (12, 14). 63 
Moreover, commitments of different stakeholders do not operate in isolation and when aligned can 64 
reinforce one another. However, the lack of methods and data to integrate policy and business 65 
perspectives prevents the design and implementation of strategies to create opportunities, or regulate 66 
for more sustainable business (12, 15).  67 
Here we combine state-of-the-art material flow, economic and biodiversity models that link demand, 68 
trade, production and impact. We use a species-level estimate of loss, which allows us to differentiate 69 
habitats that host the most vulnerable species from those that do not, but which would appear similar 70 
or identical if broader classifications (e.g. ‘forest’ or ‘natural vegetation’) were used. Our results reveal 71 
the impacts of agricultural commodity trade on biodiversity with unprecedented spatial, sectoral, 72 
operational and taxonomic resolution.  73 
We use our framework to answer four questions that together provide information for reducing 74 
biodiversity losses associated with agricultural commodity demand. First, which countries and sectors 75 
drive impacts? Understanding the role of specific consumption patterns and the responsibilities of 76 
consumers around the globe helps inform national and international policy-making. Second, what are 77 
the relative roles of different commodity traders? Detailed supply chain information can help to 78 
identify and develop partnerships for solutions. Third, what are the impacts on high-profile species and 79 
important species assemblages? Highly resolved information on biodiversity impacts can galvanise 80 
support from consumer groups, and provide information for particular interventions around specific 81 
species and risk hotspots. Fourth, how do government and private commitments overlap? 82 
Understanding the commitments of diverse actors along the supply chain can help identify where 83 
commitments coincide, and hence where actions might be aligned to reinforce one another. 84 
We work through our framework using the example of Brazilian soy production. Brazil is one of the 85 
world’s largest producers and exporters of soy, a globally important commodity embedded within 86 
many food products - particularly because of its use as a source of protein in animal feed. In Brazil, soy 87 
production is closely associated with the Cerrado (16, 17),  which is the largest savannah region in 88 
South America and hosts some 5% of global biodiversity, including over 4,800 plant and vertebrate 89 
species found nowhere else (18). It is also one of the world’s most important frontiers of agricultural 90 
expansion, with many of its species facing dire threat (16–20). Our approach produces novel insights 91 
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into the connections between markets, soy traders, and biodiversity losses at the point of production. 92 
We consider these in the context of two high-profile collective commitments: the New York 93 
Declaration on Forests, a voluntary declaration by private-, public- and third-sector parties with a 94 
commitment to end forest loss by 2030 (21); and the Amsterdam Declaration, a commitment by seven 95 
European countries to eliminate deforestation from agricultural commodity chains (22). These 96 
commitments are a recognition that things need to change; meeting them, however, requires a 97 
dramatic scaling-up of action. 98 
Results 99 
 1. Which countries and sectors are driving impacts?  100 
Information that identifies the relative roles of different countries – and sectors within them – can 101 
guide coherent action amongst consumer nations to drive more sustainable production practices, and 102 
provision of support to key industry actors (6). The top 10 countries importing embedded soy from the 103 
Cerrado are Asian, European and North American (Table 1). However, whilst international demand, 104 
especially from China, drives more than half of soy’s impacts on endemic Cerrado biodiversity, the 105 
domestic market is responsible for the greatest share of any country, with consumption across all of 106 
Brazil driving 45% of soy-related impacts (Table 1; SI Appendix 1, Table S1). We consider these findings 107 
against country-level commitments to two key declarations that aim to support companies in 108 
eliminating deforestation from agricultural commodity supply chains. The first is the New York 109 
Declaration on Forests. This has been signed at national- or local-government level by most of the 110 
countries with the greatest soy-linked biodiversity impacts in Brazilian Cerrado, but the two countries 111 
with greatest impact are notably absent (Table 1). The second is the Amsterdam Declaration, for which 112 
five of the seven European signatories are among the top 10 importers of soy-driven biodiversity 113 
impacts in the Cerrado: Italy, France, Germany, UK and the Netherlands (Table 1). 114 
Alongside the amount of soy consumed, the impact per unit consumed also varies greatly between 115 
countries. Brazil and Italy, for example, have over twice the impact per unit of soy consumed than 116 
China, France or the USA. The two largest consuming countries, Brazil and China, consume similar 117 
amounts of soy from the Cerrado, but show particularly high and low impacts per tonne, respectively 118 
(Fig. 1a). These differences arise from differences in biodiversity losses in the municipalities from 119 
which particular supply chains source soy. By combining high-resolution trade data with impacts on 120 
biodiversity we find that Brazilian consumer demand was met to a greater extent by municipalities in 121 
the central and southern Cerrado, where endemic richness is higher and impacts are thus greater (Fig. 122 
1b-c; SI Appendix 1, Fig. S1). Chinese demand, on the other hand, was met from a more tightly 123 
concentrated area in the northeast (Fig. 1c).  124 
By linking direct material flows to global financial data, our approach also captures both the re-exports 125 
of soy (for example, much of the soy consumed in Europe arrives via ports in the Netherlands, from 126 
where it is re-exported), and the consumption of soy embedded in other products, such as in meat fed 127 
on soy-derived feed. The Netherlands is a globally important trade hub, receiving much of the soy 128 
coming directly from Brazil into the EU (Fig. 1d). However, tracking supply chains only to the country 129 
of first import greatly overestimates the country’s role as a driver of biodiversity loss, while for other 130 
AD countries their role is substantially underestimated unless we consider re-exports and embedded 131 
consumption of soy (Fig. 1d).  132 
Sectoral drivers of biodiversity loss vary markedly between countries. In the case of AD countries – 133 
particularly Germany and the UK – our results highlight the importance of ‘other meat’ (primarily pig 134 
and poultry) consumption (Fig. 1e). For Italy and Norway on the other hand, dairy and beef sectors 135 
contribute a relatively larger proportion of their biodiversity footprint.  136 
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2. What are the relative roles of different traders? 137 
For the Cerrado we estimate that between 2000 and 2010, 33% of soy’s impacts on endemic species 138 
were in Goiás State, which occupies just 16% of the biome (SI Appendix 1, Fig. S2 & Table S2). Of 41 139 
traders exporting soy from Goiás in 2011, the top 10 account for 91% of exports. Disaggregating the 140 
data to municipality-level reveals the highly clustered nature of company operations (SI Appendix 1, 141 
Fig. S2). The largest exporter in each municipality accounts for a mean of 97% of exports. Just five 142 
traders account for all soy exports from the three most heavily affected municipalities, which together 143 
incur 56% of the state’s soy-driven biodiversity losses, but cover <4% of the area.  144 
3. What are the impacts on high-profile species and important species assemblages? 145 
Quantifying how consumption drives losses of charismatic, culturally important or valuable species 146 
and habitats can raise the profile of environmental issues and bring into focus the tangible impacts 147 
and risks of sourcing from a particular area (23). The spatial and taxonomic resolution of the 148 
component models in our framework enables fine-scale, species-specific information that is typically 149 
masked in national-level analyses. To illustrate this we compare impacts of soy-driven habitat loss on 150 
two iconic species – the Maned Wolf (Chrysocyon brachyurus) and Giant Anteater (Myrmecophaga 151 
tridactyla) – with impacts on endemic species, and characterise these as flows from the state in which 152 
the losses occur through to the country of final consumption of the impact-linked soy (Fig. 2). This 153 
reveals some striking patterns resulting from differences between the threats facing different species, 154 
and from differences in sourcing between consuming countries. For example, the majority of the EU’s 155 
impact on the Maned Wolf is in Mato Grosso, while for Brazil it is in other states. This has implications 156 
for the targeting of conservation interventions by downstream actors wanting to mitigate specific 157 
impacts associated with their activities. We also find that the Giant Anteater’s range has been more 158 
heavily impacted by past habitat loss than that of the Maned Wolf (which better tolerates pasture and 159 
arable land (17)), and that the EU has played a large role in recent losses – with impacts mostly arising 160 
in Mato Grosso. Unlike for the Maned Wolf and Giant Anteater, losses in Goiás and Distrito Federal 161 
dominate impacts across endemic species, largely due to the high number of endemics, particularly 162 
plants, found in these states (Fig. 2; SI Appendix 1, Fig. S1). 163 
4. How do government and private commitments overlap? 164 
In 2011, companies with zero-deforestation commitments were responsible for ~80% of soy imports 165 
for France, Germany and the UK (Fig. 3; SI Appendix 1, Table S3). The Netherlands, on the other hand, 166 
has a more diverse supplier base with ~50% supplied by traders with zero-deforestation 167 
commitments. 168 
Discussion 169 
It is encouraging that many of the countries and traders most exposed to risks of deforestation and 170 
biodiversity loss in their supply chains have joined high-profile declarations to eliminate deforestation 171 
from their supply chains (e.g. 21, 22, 24). However, company commitments to reducing deforestation 172 
in supply chains vary widely in their detail, ambition and meaning (12, 15). Understanding alignment 173 
between government and trader commitments will help identify where action should be focused, 174 
reveal potential leverage points, and help foster coordinated solutions for international supply chains 175 
that span multiple stakeholders across the private-public interface (12, 15). If supporting companies 176 
make good on their commitments, this would in turn help governments make significant progress 177 
towards their own commitments to eliminate deforestation, and may push the sustainability bar 178 
higher for smaller or newer actors in the European market. Within our analyses, the two countries 179 
with the greatest overall impacts – Brazil and China – have not yet signed key declarations at national 180 
level (although note that Mato Grosso, an important soy producing state within the Cerrado, has 181 
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committed to its Produce, Conserve and Include Strategy, which aims to reduce Cerrado deforestation 182 
by 95% and to restore habitat 25).  183 
Attributing impacts to the country of first import can both severely underestimate (e.g. Denmark and 184 
Norway), or overestimate (e.g. the Netherlands) impacts attributed to a country’s final consumption. 185 
However, in the same way that identifying key traders operating within the supply chain can help 186 
identify important opportunities for intervention, so too can identifying the most significant hubs for 187 
trade. The Netherlands is the largest importer of soy in Europe and the second largest exporter of 188 
agricultural products in the world (26). It also processes approximately 25% of its soy imports to 189 
produce animal feed (26). These factors underlie its central role in the global soy value chain, and its 190 
founding role in the Amsterdam Declaration. The Netherlands could continue to exert 191 
disproportionate influence on trading companies and buyers as a convening power and focal point of 192 
private-public dialogue and partnerships (e.g. Dutch Soy Coalition, Dutch Soy Working Group and the 193 
Dutch Soy Platform Initiative)(24, 26). The Dutch government has also provided support to processors 194 
and buyers that invest in certification (Soy Fast Track Fund), as well as to farmers to enable them to 195 
produce more sustainable soy (Farmer Support Programme)(26). In addition, governments have an 196 
important convening and financing role to play in establishing sustainable finance – including provision 197 
of credit lines to farmers that adhere to higher sustainability criteria, or support to scale up innovative 198 
solutions to sustainability challenges (e.g. 27, 28). Our estimates of the impacts of final consumption 199 
highlight the substantial responsibilities too of other EU countries, such as Spain, which is not 200 
currently signatory to the declaration but could be a focal point for targeted political influence by 201 
existing signatories (Table 1). 202 
 203 
While the Netherlands may hold some influence because its large trade volumes, its diverse portfolio 204 
of traders could make policy processes more complex and contested. In contrast to other AD countries 205 
a large proportion of soy exported to (and through) the Netherlands is from traders without zero-206 
deforestation commitments. Hence, even if those with existing commitments delivered on them, this 207 
would capture just half of the Cerrado soy traded through the Netherlands (Fig. 3; SI Appendix 1, Table 208 
S3). Working with countries that directly import substantially smaller volumes, such as the UK, France 209 
and Germany, may help the Netherlands government to encourage currently uncommitted yet major 210 
traders such as Caramuru or Granol to sign up to targets to eliminate deforestation from their supply 211 
chains. 212 
 213 
There are several sources of uncertainty within the models presented – for example in modelling land 214 
cover, estimating biodiversity loss, modelling trade, and year-to-year variability of supply chains. The 215 
Trase SEI-PCS model of subnational production and export is built from key government statistics and 216 
data that are compiled to calculate agricultural productivity and to collect tax revenues (29). This 217 
allows considerable confidence in this aspect of the modelling. The IOTA model employed in the 218 
analysis is one of several MRIO models that are available globally, all of which will provide somewhat 219 
different quantitative results due to differences in their construction (30). Our results are illustrative of 220 
the impacts that different countries might have; highlighting the heterogeneity that is expected across 221 
the trade-system. Use of such information in risk-assessment or supply chain decision making should 222 
consider the assumptions made and associated limitations of the modelling approaches. More 223 
targeted analysis (e.g. of particular supply chains looking at specific priority species) would benefit 224 
from further sensitivity analyses to explore how changes in assumptions might affect conclusions. We 225 
use 2011 trade data in our analyses that provide a snapshot of a dynamic system – particularly in the 226 
most active frontiers of agricultural expansion. Any intervention should be based on multi-temporal 227 
analyses of spatial patterns and trends, as well as iterative engagement with stakeholders to ensure 228 
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their accuracy and relevance. However, because of the investments in infrastructure (such as silos and 229 
crushing facilities) and knowledge, and interdependencies between actors, we expect traders to stay 230 
relatively connected to particular production locations over a 3-5 year span, with more significant 231 
changes occurring over longer periods (20, 31, 32; see preliminary analyses in SI Appendix 2, Figs. S3, 232 
S4). Understanding how the data available within our framework might be used to help determine 233 
accountability for impacts occurring across a dynamic trading landscape, where impacts can occur 234 
several years prior to trading activities, deserves additional research focus. 235 
Conclusion 236 
Currently, many sustainability commitments are little more than statements of intent and a 237 
recognition that things need to change (12, 15). Meeting these commitments requires collective action 238 
to be scaled-up through multi-stakeholder partnerships, landscape-scale approaches and public-239 
private initiatives (12). Identifying links between the intensification and expansion of agricultural 240 
commodity production and the demand that drives it is a vital first step to engage the political and 241 
private actors with greatest responsibility and influence. We provide a highly flexible framework for 242 
delivering a range of practical insights to stakeholders in international commodity supply chains. 243 
Businesses can use this information to understand risks in their supply chains, while civil society, 244 
consumers and shareholders can use it to hold governments and businesses to account on their 245 
commitments. Investors too are increasingly interested in understanding investment-linked 246 
environmental and social risks (33), and this will likely increase as transparency initiatives more 247 
precisely link the environmental damage caused by commodity production to hitherto-opaque 248 
financial systems underpinning it (34). 249 
The high spatial resolution of our trade model tracking production and subnational flows is a major 250 
advance for two reasons: first, in enhancing the credibility and spatial representation of estimates of 251 
environmental impact and, second, in transforming our ability to devise and implement responses. For 252 
example, campaigners can use impacts on flagship species to galvanise support from consumer groups 253 
and to promote responsible consumption across supply chain actors. Higher resolution models allow 254 
us to develop land-use management strategies to target particular areas for improving yields, setting 255 
aside areas for protection in expansion landscapes, or expanding production into degraded land 256 
according to the level of endemicity or of historical impacts on biodiversity. More generally, the spatial 257 
resolution demonstrated here allows the development of more credible estimates for a suite of 258 
indicators of environmental and social impacts. This species-level metric complements, rather than 259 
replaces, other measures of biodiversity loss based on loss of ecosystems (such as loss of Cerrado, or 260 
deforestation)(e.g. 35, 36). Taken together these provide a more complete picture of how the trade in 261 
a commodity such as soy drives both immediate and longer-term losses and has impacts at scales from 262 
the very local to global. It also allows assessment of complementarity or trade-offs between, for 263 
example, protecting forests versus endemic species. 264 
Our approach is applicable to a wide range of globally traded agricultural commodities. However, to 265 
‘catalyse a race to the top’ (14), actors must also be supported by mechanisms that allow and 266 
recognise iterative improvements. Without such mechanisms, shedding light on sustainability 267 
problems within particular supply chains may cause actors to shift to different production regions, 268 
rather than improving practices in vulnerable areas, or start supplying consuming regions without 269 
commitments to eliminate deforestation or where consumer pressure is currently lower (12, 15). 270 
Anticipating such ‘leakage’ between areas, countries and indeed different commodity crops is vital. In 271 
this context our ability to document country-trader relationships is likely to play an important role. 272 
Many of the biggest traders source from multiple producer countries, sell their goods globally, and 273 
have activities that span several commodities (37). This global reach may allow successful 274 
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sustainability initiatives to quickly scale up to other regions and commodities. By enabling monitoring 275 
of shifts of traders between markets our framework can also help minimise leakage by ensuring that 276 
sustainability commitments apply across companies’ operations. Moreover, because of the dominant 277 
role that a relatively few traders hold as a nexus of global commodity flows (38, 39), pressure from 278 
major economies - such as the AD countries - to improve environmental standards could drive 279 
improvements to the sustainability of supply chains to other consuming regions.  280 
Methods 281 
We compile and integrate existing data sources, linking complementary approaches to derive new 282 
information on consumption patterns driving species declines, and shedding light on the supply chains 283 
involved (SI Appendix 3, Fig. S5). Existing multiregional input-output models (MRIOs) use data on inter-284 
sectoral financial transactions to represent full global trade and consumption, but sacrifice 285 
commodity-specific detail and spatial resolution. Conversely, material flow analyses – descriptions of 286 
the physical movement of commodities – can be used to track production and trade of individual 287 
commodities, but generally capture only a portion of the supply chain (40). We therefore develop a 288 
hybridised MRIO for soy trade that combines traditional input-output analyses with highly detailed 289 
subnational material flow data from the Spatially Explicit Information on Production to Consumption 290 
Systems (SEI-PCS) model underpinning the Trase platform (36, 41) (SI Appendix 3). We use these to 291 
tease out the activities of producers, traders, and consumers. We link the models to estimates of 292 
species-by-species losses of suitable habitat to derive a measure of biodiversity impact that accounts 293 
for species-specific differences in range sizes, sensitivities to land-use change and historical habitat 294 
loss (17)(SI Appendix 3, Fig. S5). We focus on the impacts of soy production in 2000-10 using habitat 295 
loss data for 2000-10 and soy trade data for 2011. We chose this allocation period (i.e. attributing 296 
2000-2010 losses to 2011) because it can take several years from initial clearing of land to eventual 297 
harvesting and selling soy.  298 
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Figure Legends 393 
 394 
Fig. 1. (a) Impact of Cerrado-grown soy on endemic biodiversity (as a percentage of global impacts of soy in the Cerrado), plotted against 395 
embedded consumption of Cerrado-sourced soy (as a percentage of global Cerrado-sourced soy consumption) for the seven Amsterdam 396 
Declaration (AD) countries, Brazil, the countries of the European Union (EU28), China (including Hong Kong and Taiwan), India, North 397 
America, South America, and the Rest of the World (RoW). Grey line indicates mean global impact per unit of soy consumption. (b) Spatial 398 
pattern of our endemic biodiversity loss index within the Cerrado during the period 2000-2010; (c) Difference (tonnes) between production for 399 
domestic consumption (all Brazil) and Chinese consumption. Negative values (blue) are municipalities where production for Chinese 400 
consumption exceeds production for Brazil. Positive values (orange/red) are municipalities where production for Brazilian consumption 401 
exceeds production for China; (d) Comparison of the relative soy-attributed biodiversity impact that is directly imported to AD countries and 402 
impact that is attributed to final consumption within those countries (i.e. the latter accounts for both re-exports and embedded consumption); 403 
(e) Sectoral and country-wise differences for AD countries showing relative impact of three key soy-linked sectors as a percentage of each 404 
country’s consumption of soy across all sectors combined. Value above bar indicates the relative importance of each country to global 405 
biodiversity impacts of Cerrado-sourced soy. 406 
Fig. 2. Chord diagrams showing impacts on likelihood of persistence due to soy expansion between 2000 and 2010 for two charismatic species 407 
(top) and for all endemics (bottom left). Losses are calculated for each municipality according to the total embedded flows of soy and then 408 
aggregated to state-level for visualisation. Chords show the flow from states on the left hand side (BA=Bahia, dark blue; DF=Distrito Federal, 409 
grey; GO=Goiás, red; MA=Maranhão, cyan; MG=Minas Gerais, light green; MS=Mato Grosso do Sul, purple; MT=Mato Grosso, dark green; 410 
PI=Piauí, pink; PR=Paraná, dark olive green; RO=Rondônia, brown; SP=São Paulo, dark grey; TO=Tocantins, gold) through to the country or 411 
region of final consumption on the right hand side (Brazil; South America; North America, European Union; India; China; Rest of World). The 412 
proportion of remaining suitable habitat within the Cerrado for the two species (bottom right) and the mean for all endemic species. Light 413 
grey: suitable habitat lost from pre-industrial era to year 2000; red: losses during the 2000 to 2010 study period (as represented in the chord 414 
diagrams); medium grey: losses between 2010 and 2014; dark grey: remaining suitable habitat in 2014. 415 
 416 
Fig. 3. Alignment of government commitments with sustainability goals of key traders. Chord diagram representing direct soy trade from the 417 
Brazilian Cerrado to the seven countries of the Amsterdam Declaration from the largest traders in 2011 (companies shown were among the 418 
top 3 traders in 2011 for at least one of the countries; companies trading smaller volumes are aggregated and shaded grey). Green shaded 419 
chords indicate exports via companies with zero-deforestation commitments; orange/brown shades indicate no such commitment (data from 420 
company websites as of Dec 2018).  421 
 422 
 423 
Table 1.The countries whose embedded consumption of soy from the Cerrado in 2011 is estimated to have the greatest impact on endemic 
biodiversity (domestic plus top ten international consuming countries). Relative impact per unit mass of soy consumed from 0 (no impact) 
to 1 (greatest observed impact across all consuming regions). We highlight country commitments to the New York Declaration on Forests 
(NYDF) and Amsterdam Declaration (AD). Asterisks indicate local, but not national, government signatories to NYDF. See also SI Appendix 
1, Table S1.   




Brazil 44.9% 0.87 * 
China 22.0% 0.38  
Japan 2.9% 0.52 NYDF 
Germany 2.7% 0.49 NYDF/AD 
Spain 2.5% 0.61 * 
Thailand 2.3% 0.55  
United States of America 1.9% 0.36 NYDF 
United Kingdom 1.8% 0.46 NYDF/AD 
France 1.8% 0.33 NYDF/AD 
Netherlands 1.4% 0.60 NYDF/AD 
Italy 1.2% 0.87 AD 
 



